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Abstract
Purpose – In spite of highly publicized competitions where computers have prevailed over 
humans, the intelligence of computer systems still remains quite limited in comparison to that of 
humans. Present day computers provide plenty of information but lack wisdom. The purpose of 
this paper is to investigate whether reliance on computers with limited intelligence might 
undermine the quality of the education students receive.
Design/methodology/approach – Using a conceptual approach, the authors take the 
performance of IBMʼs Watson computer against human quiz competitors as a starting point to 
explore how society, and especially education, might change in the future when everyone has 
access to desktop technology to access information. They explore the issue of placing 
excessive trust in such machines without the capacity to evaluate the quality and reliability of 
the information provided.
Findings – The authors find that the day when computing machines surpass human intelligence 
is much further in the future than predicted by some forecasters. Addressing the problem of 
dependency on information technology, they envisage a technical solution - wiser machines 
which not only return the search results, but also help make them comprehensible - but find that 
although it is relatively simple to engineer knowledge distribution and access, it is more difficult 
to engineer wisdom.
Practical implications – Creating computers that are wise will be difficult, but educating students 
to be wise in the age of computers may also be quite difficult. For the future, one might explore 
the development of computer tools that demonstrate sensitivity to alternative answers to difficult 
questions, different courses of action, and their own limitations. For the present, one will need to 
train students to appreciate the limitations inherent in the technologies on which they have 
become dependent. Originality/value – Critical thinking, innovation, and wisdom require skills 
beyond the kinds of answers computers give now or are likely to provide in the coming decade.
Keywords Wisdom, Artificial intelligence, Education, IBMʼs Watson, Frame problem, Computers 
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When IBMʼs Watson triumphed over two top Jeopardy competitors in February 2011, the media 
buzzed with talk of artificial intelligence just as they had 14 years earlier when Watsonʼs 
predecessor, IBMʼs Deep Blue, won its rematch with world chess champion Gary Kasparov. 
Journalists and radio hosts were asking when will computing machines surpass human 
intelligence? Or had it already happened?
Perhaps some eager college administrator immediately considered the savings from installing 
Watson on campus. If it could answer student questions as well as it deals with Jeopardy 
probes, just think of all the classroom space that could be freed by sending students online 
instead of to discussion sections! Watson is an impressive engineering feat, but it is not yet time 
to assume that instructors can step away from the lectern.
Will that time ever arrive? Perhaps one day, but we believe that day is much further in the future 
than is imagined by forecasters such as Vernor Vinge and Ray Kurzweil. They have promoted 
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the idea of an imminent technological singularity, when machine intelligence will exceed that of 
humans and accelerate beyond our ability to predict and understand it (Vinge, 1993; Kurzweil, 
2005). If the singularity comes, we suspect it will be well beyond our lifetimes. A bigger 
immediate concern of ours is how society and especially its incubator, education, might change 
in the future where everyone has access to Watson-like oracles on the desktop. Or, as seems 
more likely, accessible from the cloud by every kind of networked device.
There is already a passionate debate about whether open access to online encyclopedias – 
promising instant access to the collective knowledge of humanity – enhances or detracts from 
education. Some faculty and institutions have been moved to ban students from using Wikipedia 
altogether, while simultaneously supporting more traditional scholarly endeavors that seek to 
make all manner of research available online. Almost anyone teaching on a college campus has 
stories to tell about the cut-and-paste attitude towards ʻʻresearchʼʼ that seems ever more 
prevalent among undergraduates. Watson-like natural-language interfaces to the ever growing 
databases of academic material will only make it easier for students to find what they need 
when they need it, and to merge it into whatever report they are writing without bothering to 
digest it fully. This is ʻʻScholarShip 2.0ʼʼ.
Do not get us wrong: We find the technology wondrous and it can surely facilitate collective 
human achievement. But like any developing organism, it will need to be nurtured carefully if its 
full potential is to be released. Machines that seem to know a lot are already trusted too much 
by people who do not know how to evaluate what they find. That is the essence of the Wikipedia 
problem in education. One might envisage a technological solution: wiser machines which do 
not just return the search results, but which also help make them comprehensible. But here is 
the rub. To engineer knowledge distribution and access is relatively simple. To engineer wisdom 
is not.
What do we mean by this? Think of it this way: Philosophy, a word whose very root means ʻʻlove 
of wisdomʼʼ, has as its first pivotal figure a crotchety fellow who made it his business to show 
that the others around him did not really know as much as they thought they knew, and that they  
were not wise at all. This was a thankless task for which he was eventually tried and executed. 
Wisdom, according to Socrates, comes from an appreciation of how much you do not know. But 
given that Socratesʼ compatriots were not particularly open to the message, how much harder 
would it be to get a machine to appreciate what it does not know?
The primary new computer skill displayed by Watson lay in deciphering what the question was 
in order to pursue a relatively straightforward search for factual information. But the publicity 
following Watsonʼs Jeopardy triumph also made much of Watsonʼs internal confidence indicator. 
Because Jeopardy penalizes players heavily for wrong answers, an over-confident player can 
quickly end up with a negative score. (So too can a panicking player, but emotions are not part 
of Watsonʼs program – another advantage to the machine according to some, although we are 
not so sure.) Watsonʼs algorithms for pressing the buzzer included an assessment of the relative 
likelihood of its three best candidate answers; only if the best of the three exceeded a specific 
threshold did Watson attempt to buzz in. This was evidently quite effective. Stephanie 
Kovalchik, a graduate student in the biostatistics department at UCLA, analyzed Watsonʼs 
responses for an article titled ʻʻHow wise was Watson?ʼʼ (Kovalchik, 2011). She found that 
Watson was incorrect only 10 per cent of the time it attempted to buzz in. On the 26 occasions 
when it was below threshold, its best guess would have been correct almost 20 per cent of the 
time. Kovalchik concludes that Watson could have afforded to be a bit more confident. 
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Irrespective of that, Watsonʼs actual settings allowed it to do well enough in the game. But game 
shows are closed worlds with trivial consequences. Furthermore, each mistaken response, 
whether a false positive (a wrong answer delivered) or false negative (a correct answer 
undelivered) is effectively independent. The same question will not come up again, and the 
questions are usually arranged so that there is nothing to be learned from one answer about the 
next. So, the machine does not have to learn anything from its failures, although it could 
perhaps adjust its response threshold to optimize its ratio of false positives to false negatives.
There is no indication that Watson made any such adjustments during the game to its 
algorithms, but even if it did, that would fall a long way short of the kind of self knowledge, 
metacognitive control, and reflection-driven learning that humans display in the real world.
These capacities involve more than an internal gauge of confidence. They depend on an active 
search for information outside oneʼs own memory banks and a process of creatively making 
sense of the information that is gathered. External information gathering is not allowed in 
Jeopardy. In a limited fashion, it is allowed in Who Wants to be a Millionaire? and contestants 
even may demonstrate a bit of wisdom in choosing whether to consult a friend or the audience 
for the particular question at hand. But anything approaching the talents required in high-level 
research is absent from these contests – it would make for rather slow television, anyway!
In real-world situations, there is no game show host who knows the answer. The world is open, 
and the solution to a given problem may not be known by anyone. Indeed, researchers are often 
confronted with incomplete, inaccurate, and contradictory information. People must often act 
under risk and uncertainty (Gigerenzer, 2008). In the end, students and professionals must 
decide when to curtail their search and wrap up the report. Wisdom lies not just in knowing 
oneʼs limits, not just in knowing what one does not know, but also in knowing when and where a 
bit more effort might pay off. In other words, humans make value judgments that go beyond 
assessing the accuracy of a search for a factual piece of information when they research the 
answer to an open-ended question.
In our book Moral Machines (Wallach and Allen, 2009) we assessed the challenge of building 
artificial moral agents (AMAs). We started with the observation that hardware robots that roam 
in human-occupied spaces and software ʻʻbotsʼʼ that roam in virtual environments are being 
designed and released to operate in ever more open environments, with less and less real-time 
oversight by human beings. In this respect, machines are becoming more autonomous. But they  
are, as we say in the book, ethically blind. The computers that approve or deny millions of credit 
card transactions every minute are autonomous and ethically blind. They have no information 
about the possible effects of the decision to approve or deny on the welfare of the person 
requesting the charge. Nor do they know that they do not know these things. They have no 
means to find out what they do not know. And, most importantly, they have no conception of why  
it might matter to do so.
We did not tackle the topic of wisdom in our book, but we noted that ethics has both a reactive 
and a deliberative part. The well-schooled individual has not just the tendency to do the right 
thing, but when that tendency fails, as it inevitably will, she has the means to reflect on the 
failure, learn from it, and with a bit of luck, do better next time. Whether talking about moral 
agents or epistemic agents, the virtues, as other philosophers have noted, are rather similar. A 
lack of complacency, a capacity for independent thought, and a recognition of oneʼs limits as an 
individual all feed into wise choices, whether they concern ethics or justified belief.
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ʻʻIgnorance is blissʼʼ, it is said. But bliss has a habit of ending abruptly and painfully. Intelligent 
agents readjust. People have the means to figure out what went wrong; computers, not so 
much. The pain is perhaps an important motivator; machines do not yet have such feelings or 
emotions. When Watson gets an answer wrong its programmers scramble to make sure it does 
not happen next time. Watson itself just sits there like the big lump of plastic and metal that it is. 
People notice patterns, they are aware of their potential significance, and then exploit them. 
Watson is oblivious to the wider context in which it operates (although Watsonʼs descendants 
are not necessarily doomed to be). In questioning whether Watson tells us anything much about 
human cognition, Doug Hofstadter (pers. comm.) suggests that it would not notice anything 
unusual if it got the following sequence of prompts:
1. The principal sidekick of a nonexistent person whose fanatical followers the world around 
proudly call themselves ʻʻThe Baker Street Irregularsʼʼ.
2. The first head of a US firm that used Hollerith cards to help businesses.
3. The junior member of the pair of people who first understood the coiling shape of the invisible 
substance that carries hereditary information in living organisms.
4. A device that was designed to compete against very accomplished human performers in 
rapid-fire answering of questions about what are commonly called ʻʻtriviaʼʼ.
The point is not that Watson could not be programmed to notice repetitions among the correct 
responses, but that it lacks the kind of enquiring, responsive, flexible intelligence to notice this 
pattern spontaneously. Adding a literal repetition detector would not do anything to remove the 
fact that Watson is, in fact, a giant bore with no interest in any of the facts it has been 
programmed to spit out. This is one central lack in computing machines that still no one knows 
how to engineer in.
And this is why Watson will not be replacing good teachers or wise counselors any time soon. 
People who contribute to moral and social development, who shape the society for years to 
come, know when to joke, when to cajole, when to be compassionate, when to be firm, when to 
digress, and, above all, when to say ʻʻI donʼt knowʼʼ – but without just leaving it at that. They go 
on to demonstrate how to search for an answer and evaluate it. That means not just stopping 
with the first answer you find online (whether it be in Wikipedia or the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy). It means being a critical consumer of information, not a clever regurgitator of facts 
that have been stuffed in from the outside. Good teachers and wise counselors do not just feed 
their students answers to the hardest questions, but they encourage an inquiring attitude. These 
are characteristics that our society fails to impart to as many as it should. In education, we may 
recognize good, wise teaching when we see it, but we do not really have a social technology for 
reliably producing good, wise teachers. And given that we barely understand what we are doing 
ourselves, it is not surprising that engineers or philosophers do not yet know how to give these 
qualities to machines. Maybe it is possible, maybe it is not. We firmly believe there are no sound 
a priori arguments to say that it cannot be done, or that it can. But whether or not the attempt to 
build ever more human-like machines ultimately succeeds, we also believe that a lot will be 
learned in the effort, and the effort will also force human beings to learn a lot more about 
themselves.
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There are some who would call for a moratorium on the kind of research we embrace because 
they fear a machine uprising, Terminator-style. Others would end it because they fear, 
Frankenstein-style, for the psyches of the machines themselves. Both of these fears are 
futuristic in the extreme. There is a third class of fears that have to do with the de-humanizing 
effects that the machines will have on us. Here the worries have more purchase. How many 
times have you heard, ʻʻIʼd like to help you but the computer wonʼt let meʼʼ? More subtly, when 
everything from quark physics to the latest blockbuster can be made to appear magically on 
your desktop, it conveys nothing of the individual and collective human effort that was required 
to generate that iota of knowledge. Of course the toil behind the item can be appreciated and 
information that is easily accessed can be used wisely to shape further endeavors, enabling 
new discoveries. But with so many answers to be found in just a click or two, it is easy to worry 
that the effect on human effort towards exploring harder questions is a net negative.
One concern is whether people will treat the answers so readily provided by computers as 
authoritative or approach those answers critically. Of course, the old adage ʻʻDonʼt believe 
everything you read in the newspaperʼʼ has its digital counterpart, but the seemingly impersonal 
manner in which computers deliver information may falsely suggest objectivity. Another concern 
is about what happens when answers to difficult questions do not come quickly. Might some 
students too quickly just drop the enquiry and go on to a different question? Or (as recently 
experienced by one of us) when the customerʼs problem cannot be solved on this screen or the 
next, might the person in the call center simply invent an explanation in order to get on to the 
next customer? It is an empirical question whether these kinds of outcomes will become more 
frequent when people are immersed from an early age in an environment where computers 
stand ready to answer almost any question 24x7. It is an empirical question that cannot, 
however, be easily answered experimentally. In a loose sense, the experiment has begun; but it 
is not being run with adequate controls. Nor could it be.
Creating computers that are wise will be difficult, but educating students to be wise in the age of 
computer may also be quite difficult. The discussion, then, seems to be thrown back on tales 
about students who are worse prepared than ever for their educations. Were professors not 
saying the same thing 50, 100 years ago? These laments about how things have changed for 
the worse are perhaps more nostalgia than accurate recollection. Things are certainly different. 
In the developed world, almost all of todayʼs students have grown up with the Internet at their 
fingertips. Their intelligence is measured, in large part, by their ability to get what they need from 
their environment, and that environment is ubiquitous network computing. There will be Nobel 
Prize winners who have never stepped into a traditional library, and with good reason given that 
for many purposes the online library is already a superior resource. And anyway, letʼs face it, 
most of the students in the days before the Net were not spontaneous paragons of epistemic or 
moral virtue either. Although ʻʻRTFMʼʼ (Read the F***ing Manual) is an internet-age acronym, 
people have always shown themselves more willing to ask an expert than to try to figure things 
out for themselves.
Arguably, the human tendency to imitate before innovating or investigating is why cultural 
evolution is so powerful (Richerson and Boyd, 2006). But without individuals who see and test 
the limits of what is known, a copycat culture can easily find itself in a cognitive cul de sac. 
Criticality and innovation are important parts of the engine of culture. However, by making our 
collective know-how so easily accessible, machines may disguise their ignorance as well as our 
own. When anyone might consult a computational oracle to get a diagnosis and remedy for 
whatever appears to ail them, backed up by endorsements from countless users of unknown 
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veracity, the tendency to go along with the crowd is likely to be strengthened. By the apparent 
certitude of the information computers present or the actions robots take, machines may have 
insidious effects on our epistemic and moral agency. However, machines open up new 
possibilities for action at the same time they close down some old ones.
We are not powerless in the face of the globalization of collective ʻʻknowledgeʼʼ that is embodied 
in our increasingly networked machines, and in the software bots and hardware robots that 
function with increasing autonomy, i.e. not under direct human control. Among the things we can 
do is to describe and suggest ways to implement the kinds of virtues, both moral and epistemic, 
that machines should display. There are many open questions: Should we strive to make 
machines more like ʻʻwise counselorsʼʼ in the way that they present information? Could they and 
should they show signs of hesitancy or humility when different answers or different courses of 
action are available? Can we build machines that are capable of representing and 
communicating their own limitations? What would be the social and cultural consequences of 
surrounding ourselves with such machines? Would a kind of faux artificial wisdom be worse, all 
things considered, than the faux expertise which machines currently instantiate?
We do not know how to answer these questions by philosophical reflection alone. Neither do we 
think it is feasible to stop the technological developments that are driving us to ask them. 
Nevertheless, we are not technological determinists. We may not know precisely how 
philosophical reflection on wisdom will affect the development of artificial intelligence, but we 
believe that the only viable way forward is to be guided by a combination of technological 
experimentation and critical reflection on our own limits and the limits of our technologies.
In computational terms, the problem of wisdom shares some features with what computer 
scientists call ʻʻthe frame problemʼʼ. The frame problem is the problem of determining relevance 
to a task at hand. There is not enough time in the world to consider everything you know for 
each decision that you make. So how do you frame the decision so as to include only the 
relevant information? For instance: If planning a trip to Mars, do you need to search your 
knowledge about camels? The answer may seem to be an obvious no, until you start thinking 
about issues of water conservation on such a long trip. Maybe something from camel physiology 
could help.
If you do not know what you do not know, then the problem of determining which facts you 
should investigate seems insoluble. People use emotional cues to regulate the amount of effort 
they put into problem solving. When emotional input is lacking, however, the process breaks 
down. Antonio Damasio (1995) recounts the story of a patient who has brain damage to neural 
circuitry necessary for processing emotions. The patientʼs intelligence is above average, but he 
reports having very few emotions. He is also incapable of making even simple decisions, for 
example setting an appointment date. After deliberating fruitlessly for several minutes over two 
dates offered to him, he simply accepts the one that Damasio picks for him. Without the 
intervention the patient was off on an interminable search for the things that might affect his 
decision one way or the other. An emotional predisposition for one option over another as well 
as an emotional assessment of the significance or insignificance of the decision, and of the 
relative costs of being wrong, usually prevents people from endlessly mulling over trivial 
questions.
Intelligence alone does not ensure wisdom. There are individuals with savant syndrome who 
display amazing intelligence with respect to a very narrow range of mental tasks, psychopaths 
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who are giants of industry, and brilliant yet greedy investment bankers. Computers and robots 
already outpace us mere mortals in many facets of intelligence. But reflecting on the capabilities 
necessary for building artificial moral agents forces us to recognize that much more than skill in 
manipulating symbols is necessary for making wise decisions. Emotions, consciousness, and 
experience in the world and with other beings inform good choices and actions. Wisdom is a 
special form of intelligence.
Socrates had an appointment with the executioner, but in the end he did not worry about his 
own death. He knew that he did not know what would follow, but he also knew that no amount of 
earthly effort could resolve it. Death was either eternal dreamless sleep, or a chance to 
converse with his heroes in the afterlife for ever more. In either case, he was happy. After a life 
of questioning everything and everyone, and urging others to examine their own lives, his 
emotions told him nothing was to be gained by seeking to learn what could not be learned. That 
was the wisdom of the philosopher.
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